美 威廉·拉普
贺尚锋 郭宏伟 编译
本文编译自美国陆军军事学院《参考》杂志2004年夏季刊（半年刊）。
【内容提要】 作者认为，虽然美日军事同盟的现状非常令人满意，但是冷战结束后，随着世界安全形势的变化，美日军事同盟发展的促进与制约因素有了许多新的内涵，作者对这些因素进行了深入分析，对美日军事同盟的发展做了展望，并对美国政府应采取的政策提出了建议。
【主题词】 美国 日本 军事同盟 现状 展望
【作者简介】 威廉·拉普，中校军衔，美国职业军人，毕业于美国军事学院，尔后就读于美军陆军军事学院，并先后获得了政治学的硕士与博士学位。毕业后在东京国际事务关系研究中心工作。2004年6月，到华盛顿第一军团任职。
编译者贺尚锋、郭宏伟均为南京陆军指挥学院硕士研究生
2003年3月31日的早晨，在伊拉克工作的日本五人医学小组接到东京命令，返回大马士革，以避免可能到来的危险。12月，两名日本驻伊外交官被害，导致了日本国内80%以上的民众要求减缓或停止向伊拉克派兵。2004年4月初的日本人质危机再次导致国内强烈的反战情绪。一些日本政治评论家甚至预言，如果类似的事件再度发生，将会导致小泉内阁跨台。
与这种高涨的反战情绪形成鲜明对比的是，在2001年9·11事件后不久，日本的反恐特别法案（明确规定了日本可以向海外派兵）在议会中以高票获得通过，并得到了日本民众的广泛支持，日本随即派遣驱逐舰和油轮向驻印度洋的美军部队运送补给；2003年12月，美日海军特种部队首次采取联合行动，到珊瑚岛去检查可能存在的大规模杀伤性武器。以上这些举动都表达了日本人对共同参与军事行动的强烈渴求。
日本国内这些自相矛盾的举动也体现在当前的美日军事同盟中。一方面，尽管日本从中东地区得到了91%以上的石油，但却不想在保持这个地区的安全稳定上独立承担任何风险；另一方面，实力不断增强的日本自卫队又十分积极参与各种联合军事行动。
在未来的二、三十年甚至更长时间内，日本对美国的这种自相矛盾的举动会越来越多。日本将会更多的依赖美国来应对来自多方面的安全挑战，同时又会急于摆脱美国的束缚，在对外政策上获得更大的自主权。尽管目前同盟的关系表面上看来近乎完美，但这可能只是一个假象，最终的战略性分歧将不可避免。
美国与日本同仇敌忾、患难与共的日子即将过去，尤其是在朝核危机彻底解决之后。对即将到来的战略分歧，美国从自身利益出发，会避免做出正面反应，并试尝寻求一个“双赢”的解决方案，既要使日本继续支持这个同盟，同时也要采取适当的措施来巩固和加强美国在东亚地区的军事力量。在东亚地区，美国最重要的利益在于保持对这一地区的军事控制能力，维护其稳定与安全，至于它的外在形式是一个同盟，还是其它什么东西并不重要。当前的美日军事同盟是维护美国这一重要利益的一种很好的形式，但由于未来十年内即将出现的利益分歧，美日军事同盟正面临着分裂，正如一些政治评论家所言，美日在东亚地区的同盟已经走到了尽头。
对同盟含义的不同理解
国与国之间建立同盟关系的目的各不相同。就美国和日本来说，1951签定同盟条约的初衷是在双方实力极不相称的前提下，日本需要美国的保护，美国则以保护日本安全为由获得到了在这一地区永久驻军的权力。五十多年过去了，世界形势发生了根本变化，外敌入侵日本的直接威胁基本上不存在，双方合作的基础因此也就受到了动摇，这是美日军事同盟发生分歧的最根本的原因。
据此，我们就能够理解为什么美日对“同盟”的含义会有不同的理解。同盟条约虽经过1960和1997年两次的修订，但仍清楚地明确了日本的职责是提供基本的后勤补给、保护美国在日本军事基地的安全以及向驻日美军提供必要的军事设施。日本强调：同盟条约是两国行动的唯一依据，双方要严格按照条约的规定行事。因此，多年来，日本严格按照条约的规定，认真履行各项职责。而美国则认为：过去制定的条约只是一种承诺，许多内容现在已经过时了，这种不合时宜的条约不应该成为两国在更深层次展开合作的限制，两国都应该突破条约的束缚，在广泛的领域内展开合作。于是，矛盾就产生了：美国对日本的要求越来越多，但日本却不愿意有任何作为，这使得美国很是恼火，日本的麻烦也就随之而来了。
日本的安全政策进退维谷
当今日本国内关于安全政策有着越来越多的争论，争论的结果将会在较大的程度上决定日本在21世纪的发展道路。一些人担心，如果日本过多地参与盟军的军事行动，或者在国际事务中过分活跃，那么日本将会面临被重新卷入战争的危险；而另一些人认为，日本应该更加积极地参与同盟的各项事务，以防止被美国抛弃，尤其是在解决朝鲜问题上，如果没有美国的支持，日本将会将举步维艰；还有一些人强调，日本应该在国际事务中有自己独立的角色，而不是处处看美国的眼色行事。日本是继续作一个信奉和平至上的国家，还是重新回到上个世纪30年代军国主义的老路，这都不是日本人想选择的。要达成一条中间路线又会十分困难，但这是日本所必须面对的。
朝鲜半岛的危险性正在不断增加，这严重制约着日本军事独立的进程。同时，在伊拉克这场日本被迫参与的远离本岛的战争中，日本自卫队员正面临着越来越多的危险，这也在一定程度上动摇了谋求军事独立的民族主义者的决心。
在过去的十年中，日本已经向建立一支既能在21世纪保卫本土的安全，又具备一定的海外作战能力的军事力量的目标迈出了一大步。但是，日本要想建成一个基本的防卫体系，至少还需要10到15年的时间，这一体系一旦建成，日本就很可能突破“自卫”的范畴，在更广泛的领域内展开军事行动。
日本的军事战略如何发展，将在很大程度上取决于美国的态度——是否还会将日本视为控制东亚地区最重要的盟友。美国对日本在维护亚洲的和平、稳定、民主和经济自由化方面的期望值越来越高，包括维护西南亚地区和海上重要通道的安全，打击东亚地区的恐怖主义等，而实际上，这些事应该由美国人来做，同盟条约中也是这样规定的，因此日本对这些要求的反应极为冷淡。美日军事同盟在未来的十年内会发生哪些变化，现在还难以确定。虽然两国高层对于同盟的现状都非常满意，但是这种乐观情绪将很快随着同盟间迅速出现的诸多分歧而改变。在将来的几十年的时间内，可能导致这些分歧的因素将会越来越多，如果两国将来都无法再将彼此视做可靠的盟友，他们都会寻求一种全新的模式取代目前的这种同盟形式。
促进美日军事同盟发展的因素
冷战的结束使美日关系与美欧关系一样，同盟明确的战略针对性不断减弱，两国对同盟未来发展战略的分歧不断加深。在过去的十年里，国际形势的新变化使处于低迷的同盟关系有所缓和，两国间的利益再一次紧密的联系到了一起，这对于促进同盟关系的发展起到了重要作用。例如朝核危机的出现，很可能使日本与东亚各国间半个世纪以来的恩怨情仇，再次成为引发东北亚大规模地区冲突的导火索，解决这些问题，日本与美国不得不加强合作。
朝鲜。朝鲜对外政策的不确定性，自上世纪90年代以来就迫使日本不得不强化安全意识，加强与美国的合作。1998年，朝鲜的导弹突然飞过日本上空，日本对朝鲜的恐惧也随之而来，这坚定了日本提高自身军事能力的决心。美国和日本都在为朝鲜的核问题担忧，而解决朝鲜问题不得不考虑诸多亚洲邻国的态度，这使日本无法单独面对，必须寻求美国的支援。因此，来自朝鲜的威胁将促使美国和日本在军事领域的进一步合作，加强同盟关系。
恐怖主义。在反恐战争中一致的利益使得同盟关系进一步加强。1995年的东京地铁投毒案和2001年的9·11恐怖袭击事件，使日本感到了来自国内外恐怖主义的威胁，这也是日本在2001年11月迅速通过反恐特别法案的一个原因。特别法案第一次允许日本自卫队为了反恐目的而出兵海外，并允许日本为应对恐怖主义主义的威胁而扩充军事力量，这立刻引起了亚洲邻国的强烈质疑。因此，要全面提高日本应对恐怖主义的能力，必须与美国加强合作。
弹道导弹防御系统 (BMD)。弹道导弹防御系统的建设规划，将会在不久的将来使美日关系更加密切。日本人没有技术能力探测导弹的发射，也就无法对来自朝鲜的导弹采取有效的防卫措施。在未来的十多年里，日本人必须依靠美国情报系统，完善其防卫体系。此外，要提高从发现到实施拦截敌国导弹的反应速度，日本军队必须做出重大的改革，这也需要美国的支持。独立防御的有限性使维持并加强同盟关系成为可能，因此，在未来的几十年内，日本将继续以一个成员国的身份积极参与弹道导弹防御系统的建设。日本人加强本国军力建设的决心，增强了美国对日本的信任；共同投资和生产弹道导弹防御系统的重要设备，也使两国间的关系更加密切。
海上石油通道的安全。为了保卫通向海湾地区的海上通道，自上个世纪90年代以来，日本军队开始积极地参与东北亚地区的各类海上军事演习。同美国一样，日本的繁荣和发展，与通向波斯湾地区海上通道的安全密切相关。由于日本91%以上的石油来自于海湾地区，但印尼和菲律宾海域的海盗猖獗，严重威胁着通向海湾地区海上运输的安全，这让日本找到了出兵海外的理由。不过，仅凭其单薄的海上力量，还难以完成保障海上通道安全的使命，要保证这一重要通道的安全与顺畅，日本必须加强与美国的合作。
增强海外作战能力。为了不断提升海外作战能力，日本对美国 F–16战斗机进行了改装，并重新命名为 F–2 战斗机，使燃料携带量增加了 25% ，携带导弹的数量增加了2枚；日本还购买了B–767型空中加油机，以进一步增强其战斗机的续航能力；日本最新设计的全数字化小型航空母舰已经能够让垂直起降飞机起落，初步具备了作战能力。总体上，美国欢迎日本的这些发展，因为这样不但能够分担一些美国在东亚的军事压力，而且使日本在全球范围内参与美国发起的各类军事行动成为可能。
缺乏能够取代同盟来保证日本安全的战略性措施。目前还没有一种能够取代同盟的有效的战略性措施来保证日本的安全，这是促使同盟发展的根本原因。虽然日本正在积极参与东盟安全论坛的各项活动，但这一组织只是一种形式，并没有实质上的战略意义；朝鲜就像日本旁边的一个火药桶，随时都有爆炸的可能；中国的迅速强大对日本的安全形势会带来哪些影响还是一个未知。应对这些挑战，日本还必须依靠美国。
制约美日军事同盟发展的因素
目前，日本在经济上萎靡不振，而且资源严重短缺，在经济发展上面临着诸多困难；美国对待日本的态度日益骄横，使长期以来日本国内广泛存在的对于同盟性质的疑问进一步加深，这些都会影响同盟关系的进一步发展。
经济的困扰。日本的宏观经济形势仍在继续低迷。庞大的预算赤字，已经占政府开支的48%，国家正面临着巨大的债务压力；银行业的信贷危机仍在持续，政府不得不采取使部分银行国有化的措施以避免更多的银行倒闭；日本的老龄人口已经超出了其社会保障体系所能承受的范围，而且，人口老龄化的趋势还在进一步加剧，在未来的几十年内，日本将面临更加严重的养老金危机。这种严峻的经济形势所造成的直接结果有两方面：第一，日本大量的公司到劳动力和资源丰富的中国投资，这就使日本政府不得不加强和改善与中国的关系；第二，政府能够提供的国防经费越来越少，而没有足够的经费，就难以维持与美国良好的同盟关系。由于缺乏国防经费，日本还离不开美国的保护，但是日本在增强自身军事能力上的无能为力，加重了美国的负担，这将会增大两国间的分歧。
能源的匮乏。众所周知，日本是一个极度缺乏能源的国家，不得不从中东地区进口超过其需求总量91%的石油。目前日本正积极寻求能够从其它地区进口石油，以减小对中东地区的依赖性。为了获取远东地区的石油，日本与俄罗斯关系正在升温，这增加了美日之间的政策摩擦。对于石油的渴求很可能会使日本背离美国的政治立场，从而主动向亚洲和北非的一些国家示好。美国最关注的是全球范围内反恐和防止大规模杀伤性武器扩散的问题，而日本最关心的却是石油和天然气的进口问题，这种分歧将会直接破坏两国的关系。虽然这种状况已经有所好转，但是最近美国对来自日本的钢铁课以重税的举动，表明了华盛顿与东京之间新的一轮摩擦正在产生。与上世纪90年代相比较，虽然那时日本的经济正处在低谷，但是日本还是能够冷静谨慎地处理好两国的关系。而近年来的异常举动表明了日本政府正面临着来自国内越来越大的压力。日本外务省曾经是美国政策最有力的支持者，现在不得不让步于经济、贸易和工业等部门，在政策上支持那些有利于刺激经济增长的政策，而毫不在乎美国的态度。只要经济复苏还没有完成，日本的经济、贸易和工业等部门就会在国内政策上占据主导地位，其它主管对外政策的部门不得不服从于这一需要。
东亚地区的地缘政治。日本与中国尽管存在着突出的历史矛盾，最近又有领土上的纠纷，但是由于两国间的巨大贸易额可能会使两国关系在一定程度上得到缓和。2003年，日本与中国的双边贸易额达到1320亿美元，比2002年增长了30%，中国已经取代美国成为日本的第一大贸易伙伴。相对日本目前低迷的经济形势来说，与中国的贸易关系，对于快速改善日本的经济状况和预算赤字是至关重要的。台湾是日本的第四大贸易伙伴，日本与台湾的关系也是日美关系的一大障碍，由于布什政府加强了与台湾军事上的联系，许多日本人担心由此导致中美关系的紧张，进而连累日本，使本来就较为紧张的中日关系雪上加霜。此外，日本一直致力于用和平方式解决朝核危机，这离不开中国的努力，也是导致日本不顾美国的反对，急于改善日中关系的一个重要原因。
民族主义的再生。目前，日本的民族主义情绪不断高涨，并且，这种情绪已经在日本的内外政策上有所表现。日本新生代在谈到与美国的同盟关系时，几乎异口同声地表达了对于获得独立自主的政治地位的强烈渴求和决心。虽然许多亚洲邻国都非常担心日本军国主义会因此复活，但是日本人相信自己会做出一个正确的选择，既不看处处美国的脸色行事，又防止走上军国主义的老路。这种折中的选择方案看起来确实很好，但是军国主义思想在日本人心中已经是根深蒂固，急于强化军事能力必然会导致这种思想死灰复燃，给日本乃至整个世界带来新的灾难。
对美国对外政策的担心。美国越发强大的军事力量，使日本各个阶层的人们都感到一种潜在的威胁。像德国、法国、中国和俄国等许多国家一样，日本也同样担心美国的霸权主义倾向，以及未经联合国批准到处乱施武力。在日本民意调查中，朝鲜和美国被认为是两个最有可能使日本卷入军事冲突的国家。从“先发制人”攻打伊拉克，到对许多国际性组织和协议所表现出的轻蔑态度，美国政府在日本民众中的信任率已经降低到了一个前所未有的水平。
对共同军事行动的犹豫不决。日本高层认为美国的判断力是可靠的，这是日本之所以冒险参与到美国人认为是必要的军事行动的主要原因。但是日本的民众却不这样认为，虽然在美国世贸中心遭到恐怖袭击之后，民众对通过反恐特别法案给予了很高支持, 但是他们还是不愿意让日本冒险去参与由美国发起各类军事行动。在2003年夏季，小泉首相就向美国保证要出兵伊拉克，但是经过了将近七个月的无数次调查与公开辩论之后，第一支日本小分队才得以到达伊拉克。虽然布什政府尽力避免公开地对日本施加更大的压力，但是摩擦已经在双方产生。
公众个人安安危至上的“大安全观”。过去六十年的和平岁月已经使日本国民的安全观念发生了深刻的变化，他们认为国民个人的安全要比整个国家的安全重要得多，这就是日本人所谓的“大安全观”。这是一种失去理性的思维，颠倒了国家与个人安全的重要性，既使是在国家生死存亡的关键时刻，也要首先考虑个人的安危。在东京，无论是政客还是平民百姓，只有少得可怜的一部分人支持“国家安全高于个人安全”的观点。来自于海湾地区的石油，毫无疑问是日本的生命线，但与公民的个人利益比起来，还是要处于从属地位；通过反恐战争来消除隐患以获得长久的安全环境，也要从属于日本公民的个人安全；同样，采取强硬路线，来应对以日本为主要目标之一的朝鲜核武器，也要首先考虑日本被绑架公民和他们家庭的感受。今天，日本国民这种个人安全至上的安全观念严重阻碍着美日军事同盟的进一步发展。
影响美日军事同盟发展的不确定因素
美日军事同盟的发展具有很大的不确定性。对不愿冒任何风险的日本人和日益骄横的美国人来说，他们之间的同盟关系，可能会最终以一个战略上的模糊概念来代替最终的分裂，也可能彻底演变成军事上的相互利用关系。导致最终结局的因素是多方面的，最根本的是日本随着国家安全体系的建立与不断完善，对同盟的态度也不断发生变化。如上所述，由于朝鲜核威胁、恐怖主义及武器扩散等原因，日本逐渐意识到21世纪安全形势的严峻性，并不断努力提高自身的军事能力。2003年防卫白皮书和2004年度财政预算报告，都清楚地表明了日本对独立的军事能力的强烈渴求，比如发展精确制导武器和建立有效防御体系等。这种发展是美国所一直期待的，但这种发展能否会促进美日军事同盟的良性发展，现在还难以确定，既可能促进同盟关系的发展，也可能使日本最终摆脱美国，走上完全自立的道路。
日本经济的发展对同盟未来的影响也同样具有不确定性。完全摆脱美国，建立独立的防御体系，需要花很多钱，除非日本把当前占国民生产总值1个百分点的国防预算，提高到3到5个百分点，否则就无法迅速建立起有效的防御体系。但这笔数额巨大的开支将使日本在未来的十年内无法摆脱经济萧条的困扰，再加上日本即将面对日益沉重的社会福利保障的压力，都会动摇日本民众建立独立防御体系的决心。因此，既有选择地发展自身的军事能力，又保持当前的同盟现状，不危及与美国的关系，这种折衷的做法对日本来说是一个不错的选择。
日本的能源策略也会像经济的情形一样，在未来的十年内，对同盟的发展带来许多不确定性因素。当前，日本91%以上的石油进口来自于中东，为了设法摆脱这种依赖，日本正在全球范围内寻找新的能源合作伙伴。与俄罗斯的石油与天然气合作，将会导致与中国的直接竞争，同时也要求日本与许多对美国不友好的国家在战略上采取让步。这些都会影响美日关系和日本发展独立防御体系的决心。
与中国关系的发展也是一个不确定性因素。日本在国际问题上处处看美国的脸色行事的时代已经结束了，这一点突出地表现在与中国之间的暧昧关系上。虽然中国的长期快速发展令日本担忧，但在经济上的相互依赖正在增加，两国都在积极倡导建立多边世界而且都强烈反对美国的霸权主义行为，这些共同点正在慢慢地密切中日关系。美国如何看待中日关系，将会直接影响同盟未来的发展。
2015 年前的同盟状况分析及对美国政策的建议
冷战结束以来，美国在世界各个地区的盟友都在逐渐远离美国。冷战时期建立起来的同盟是迫于当时的安全形势的一种无奈选择，如今，实力强大的对手已经不存在了，安全形势发生了根本性的变化，美国必须寻求一种全新的合作模式，而不再依赖长期的正式同盟关系，来应对这种变化。
在2015 年，美日安全同盟仍将会正式存在着。然而，两国都将会在建立超越同盟关系之外的更加独立的军事力量上迈出更大的步伐。美国会更加注重保持东亚地区的战略平衡，而不是单独支持某一个国家。那时与中国和俄国的战略对峙局面也许会有所改变，日本将拥有一支更具战斗力的作战力量，使东亚地区的安全形势更加乐观。日本将会公开地修改其宪法第九章中的有关限制军力发展的规定，不但允许军事力量的存在，而且还允许日本与其它国家建立军事伙伴关系。总之，在2015年，这种畸形的同盟关系将会在很多方面产生更大的分歧。
美国与日本之间的同盟关系在三种特别情况下，也可能得到进一步强化，这三种情况是：中国反日情绪持续高涨、中国大陆与台湾之间发生战争以及中国宣布对南海地区的专有权。此外，如果朝鲜在反日大旗下最终统一，也会促进美日同盟关系的进一步发展。
为了应对即将到来的变化，美国应在未来的十多年时间内采取如下政策：
一、加速推进弹道导弹防御系统的建立，以尽快使日本摆脱目前的政治窘境和安全压力；
二、让日本人分别在驻美日军总部、美军太平洋指挥总部、五角大楼担任实质性角色，使日本在同盟中有更多的发言权；
三、保持并加强布什政府当前采取的与日本经常性的高层会晤机制，以此使日本和其它亚洲盟国感到日本与美国关系重要性；
四、认真对待日本提出的修改同盟协议的要求，并撤走冲绳岛上的部分美国海军部队，在2005年伊拉克战争结束之后，至少撤走两个营的海军陆战队，作为向日本做出实质性让步的象征。
五、如果日本将其武装力量“合法化”，美军要首先在其它亚洲盟国前对这一做法表示充分认可；
六、通过在亚洲建立多边安全机制来提高亚洲安全事务的透明度，例如在制止武器扩散问题上要及时沟通，为采取共同行动奠定基础；
七、在东亚和东南亚地区建立新的军事基地并部署适当的力量。在关岛和西太平洋地区要增加军事基地的数量，在澳大利亚、菲律宾、泰国、新加坡和越南建立新的军事基地。
附英文原文摘要：
Past its Prime？The Future of the US-Japan Alliance
WILLIAM E. RAPP
Lieutenant Colonel (P) William E. Rapp is a career soldier who has served in a variety of assignments in the US Army. Most recently he was a Council on Foreign Relations - Hitachi International Affairs Fellow at the Institute for International Policy Studies in Tokyo. He is a graduate of the US Military Academy and holds an M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University. Following graduation from the Army War College in June 2004, he will be assigned to I Corps, Fort Lewis, Washington.
Early on the morning of 31 March 2003, a five-man medical team from Japan--the sole Japanese contingent on the ground near Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom--was ordered by Tokyo to pack up and move back to Damascus to avoid potential harm. In December, the killing of two Japanese diplomats in Iraq caused over 80 percent of Japan's public to demand a slowdown or outright halt in Tokyo's commitment to send troops to Iraq. Similar sentiments rose during the Japanese hostage crisis of early April 2004. Some Japanese commentators even predict the downfall of Prime Minister Koizumi should any ground forces deployed to Iraq be killed--a potentiality that has made Tokyo extremely cautious with the use of those troops.
Contrast this tormented intransigence with the Japanese Diet's rapid passage of anti-terrorism legislation in November 2001 and the dispatch of destroyers and tankers to refuel Coalition forces in the Indian Ocean. Consider also the sight of Japanese and American naval special forces fast-roping from an Australian helicopter to the deck of a freighter in the Coral Sea to check for potential ballistic missiles in September 2003. This training exercise, the first within the new Proliferation Security Initiative, is indicative of Tokyo's warm embrace of this particular collective security enterprise.
These examples highlight the strange dichotomy that the US-Japan Security Alliance represents. On one hand, the Japanese are reluctant to share substantive risk in ventures in Southwest Asia, even though they receive more than 91 percent of their oil from that region. On the other hand, the Japanese are readily embracing other initiatives with their increasingly capable military forces which might improve their security.
Over the next two to three decades, Japan will present an increasing paradox to the United States. Japan will liberalize and expand its security posture in broad ways long sought by the United States, but at the same time will increasingly desire to chart its own course in foreign policy. In terms of reliability as a security partner across a range of issues, Japan will tend to become more Gaullist than Thatcherite, more French than British in its response to American pressure for concerted action. Current alliance closeness (which has caused a good deal of euphoria among normally pessimistic alliance managers on both sides) may be an illusion that highlights the crossing of strategic vectors, not the convergence of them.
In the future, the United States should not expect enhanced congruence in interests and methods with Japan, especially after the resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Because of the coming strategic divergence, the United States should hedge and pursue a two-pronged grand strategy of attempting to buttress the alliance with Japan while seeking alternative means to maintain a forward presence and power-projection basing in the East Asian littorals. The American vital interest in East Asia is the maintenance or a stable, liberal balance of power in the region, not any particular alliance orientation. The alliance with Japan has been a highly convenient and effective means for achieving this balance. However, as interests diverge in coming decades, the pact may not offer the same benefits. As Rajan Menon notes, the age of formal alliances in East Asia may be coming to an end.
In order to present the argument for the United States to adopt a strategic hedge in Northeast Asia, this article will set the foundation by examining the notion of alliance reliability and the competing values that dominate, and obfuscate, Japanese strategic intentions. Next, the trends both enhancing and reducing alliance reliability between the two partners will be outlined. This discussion will lead to specific predictions about the next two decades in the alliance relationship and policy recommendations for the United States.
Differing Connotations of Alliance Reliability
States create security alliances with other states for a variety reasons. In the case of the United States and Japan, the original purpose of the 1951 and 1960 treaties was an exchange of asymmetrical security guarantees that both partners valued. The United States gained basing rights in exchange for securing the Japanese homeland. As the alliance has matured over the past five decades and the threat of direct invasion of the archipelago has all but evaporated, the focus of the partnership has lost its clarity. As a result, expectations of what is meant by reliability on the part of both partners have begun to diverge.
Alliance reliability in this instance has two connotations—formal and informal. The Japanese observe the more formal definition that ties reliability to the letter of the agreement. The 1960 revision of the treaty, modified by the 1997 Revised Guidelines, specifies clearly the responsibilities of the Japanese to provide basing, logistical support, force protection to bases, and use of infrastructure.8 In this regard, the Japanese are upholding the treaty provisions extremely well. However, the United States tends to view longstanding alliances in a more informal manner. In this view, alliances this old and established are commitments that states make to one another which go beyond the mere letter of the treaty.
After years of providing the protection that Japan has used to build its economic strength, the United States expects the Japanese to shoulder more of the risk involved in maintaining security in regions vital to both countries. Even though the Japanese have never reneged on a formal alliance commitment, many informed Americans--who view alliances more informally--tend to think Japan is not doing all it can or should as an American security partner. This represents a fundamental divergence of alliance presumptions. While this state of alliance expectations and unfulfilled demands is worrisome for Americans, it is deeply troubling to the Japanese as they attempt to shape their strategic future and manage the conflict between their grand strategic goals.
Japan's Security Policy Dilemma
Within Japan today there exists a growing debate about the future direction of its security policy. The angst of this fundamental and increasingly public confrontation between hawks and doves, nationalists and internationalists, and the young and old grows daily. On the grand scale, three competing interests tend to cloud the desired path for Japan into the 21st century. The older and more pacifist segments of Japanese society desire to avoid entrapment in a war that may come about if they drift too far toward an active military role in the alliance with the United States or take on too much international leadership. The younger and more realist of politicians, academics, and the public want to prevent abandonment by the United States, especially with respect to North Korea, If they are seen as not supportive enough of US policies. Finally, those in the growing nationalist movement are increasingly interested in the pursuit of self-interest and advancing Japan's own specific goals, although, as a society, such national interests continue to elude broad based articulation and acceptance. The common perception that Japan will either remain pacifist or veer to the extreme of its 1930s militarism is simply wrong--a middle ground may be difficult to achieve but is nonetheless available to the Japanese. Trying to determine a future strategy in security policy amid these often competing imperatives continues to pose difficulties for Tokyo and results in Janus-like responses to security issues.
The diagram in Figure 1 describes these three competing national security objectives and offers potential policy choices at the various intersections. The volatile situation in North Korea restrains Japanese security independence at the same time the growing insurgency in Iraq focuses public attention on the hazards of entrapment by the United States in a conflict away from Japanese shores. As a sense of nationalism continues to develop within Japan, the dilema may be resolved through the development of critical military capabilities and the resulting potential for greater independence of security policy.
In the past decade, Japan has made significant strides to build a more independent military capable of defending the home islands against 21st-century threats and projecting Japanese power abroad. It will be at least 10 to 15 years before Japan will have a basic missile defense system; full-package, precision-strike capability; integrated and responsive command, control, and intelligence structures; and power-projection platforms, but those capabilities are currently under construction.9 As Japan develops those capabilities, and loosens its domestic controls on the use of military force, its strategic options for achieving basic national security goals will increase.
The increase in Japanese strategic options will change how the United States views the future reliability of Japan as its primary ally and partner in achieving balance and stability in East Asia. The United States is increasingly looking to Japan to assist actively in the maintenance of peace, stability, democracy, and free markets in Asia. This means substantively participating in Southwest Asian security, maintaining sea lanes of communication, countering terrorism in East Asia, and other such heretofore Americanled initiatives. Given the well-documented exceptions, the Japanese response to most of these initiatives has so far been tepid. The vectors of strategic direction both the United States and Japan will follow over the next decade are not clear. Although alliance managers on both sides are highly optimistic about the closeness of the vectors at the present time, they may very likely be simply crossing on different trajectories leading to very disparate positions in the future. Therefore, it is highly useful to review some of the factors that may enhance and reduce alliance reliability between the United States and Japan in the coming decades. If the two nations do not view each other as reliable allies, they will seek security in alternative forms. By looking at these specific situations and considering their likely trend lines, we can better predict the future state of the alliance.
Factors Enhancing US-Japan Alliance Reliability
The end of the Cold War reduced the strategic clarity of purpose for the US-Japan alliance. Similar to the American relationship with Europe, a fog of uncertainty about the future has descended over the partnership. Over the past decade, however, several strategic factors have lifted some of this murkiness and provided the alliance a renewed sense of direction and mutual advantage. These situations tend to keep the vectors of national interest in close proximity and thus are critical to maintaining a sense of reliability within the alliance. Some of these situations are geostrategic, while others represent Japanese and American reactions to the changing security environment of the post-Cold War world. It is fitting to begin with the situation on the Korean Peninsula, long considered the "dagger pointed at the heart of Japan" and the epicenter of centuries of northeast Asian conflict.
·North Korea. Kim Jong I1 and the erratic policies of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) have been the driving force in the awakening of Japanese security concerns and military posture in the 1990s and serve to heighten cooperation within the US-Japan alliance. The Taepodong missile overflight of the Japanese islands in 1998 did more to encourage a Japanese commitment to increased military capability than did decades of American gaiatsu (foreign pressure). Both the United States and Japan are deeply worried about the future trajectory of a nuclear-equipped North Korean state, and in the long run by a unified Korea strategically tied more to its historical suzerain-China-than to the West. This convergence of threat perceptions about Korea continues to fuel vast improvements in military cooperation between the United States and Japan.
·Terrorism. Mutual interests in the war on terror have brought heightened optimism to alliance managers on both sides. The sarin gas attack by Aum Shinryko on the Ginza subway line in Tokyo in 1995 brought home to the Japanese a sense of immediate vulnerability. This sense of societal exposure created the conditions that made the rapid passage of Japan's Anti-Terrorism Special Measures legislation of November 2001 possible. This new law allowed Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) for the first time to deploy warships to the western Indian Ocean and pushed the far boundaries of the long-held prohibition against collective defense. Both terrorism and the threat of ballistic missiles have become focal points for Japan's rejuvenation of its military force posture. The 2003 Defense of Japan White Paper clearly outlines the need for greater military capability to confront these threats. Attaining these capabilities--in areas such as ballistic missile defense, precision strike, and maritime interdiction--will require enhanced cooperation with the United States.
·Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). Combined BMD infrastructure and mutual dependencies that will arise from this cooperation will tend to bring the two allies closer together in the near future. Because the Japanese do not have the technical capability to detect missile launches and coordinate their defense against a saturation attack from North Korea, for the next decade-plus they will be forced to rely on a missile defense system integrated with American space and sea-based assets. Since the Japanese depend on American intelligence, and because the time span between hostile launch and necessary intercept launch precludes traditional mobilization authority rules, significant changes in Japanese military policy will likely emerge in the next decade as BMD cooperation continues. The removal of the ban on collective self-defense offers the possibility of a truly integrated and risk-sharing military alliance.
·New Weapon Systems Procurement. The decisions by the Japanese over the past seven years and into the next decade to obtain new military capabilities also will likely improve the depth and reliability of the alliance. Direct procurement and joint production on critical systems like ballistic missile defense, the Joint Strike Fighter, and Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) will make the two militaries more interoperable and interdependent. Changes by Japan in technology export policies to facilitate actual production of these systems will be a near-term signal of this growing interdependence.
·Maritime Freedom of Action. At the same time the Maritime Self Defense Force destroyers escorted supply vessels toward the Persian Gulf, Japan began to participate more rigorously in naval exercises in Southeast Asia. Like the United States, Japan relies on free and open sea lanes of communication for its prosperity and attainment of vital interests. With over 90 percent of its oil transiting from the Persian Gulf region, Japan is critically concerned with maritime security and freedom of action--a ready source of congruence with the US Navy. Piracy in Indonesian and Filipino waters continues to pose a major problem for trade-dependent countries in the region and has provided a legitimate, although not fully welcomed, venue for increased Japanese naval activity beyond its coastal waters.
·Increasing Ability to Use Force Abroad. In conjunction with new policies allowing for a more aggressive use of military assets abroad, the Japanese are developing military capabilities clearly designed to project force away from the home islands. Japan's modifications to the American F- 16 aircraft, renamed the Japanese F-2 fighter, resulted in 25 percent greater fuel capacity and two additional hard points for ordnance. Combined with airrefueling training, the decision to buy B-767 refuellers, and the August 2003 decision to buy JDAM kits, the Japanese soon will have limited precisionstrike capability. The commissioning of the large Osumi class of flat-deck, helicopter and landing-craft capable transports allowed for the deployment of Japanese troops to East Timor and Iraq. Finally, the recent design unveiling the new 16DDH class of small aircraft carriers--capable of handling VSTOL aircraft--clearly indicates a desire to be able to project force internationally. For the most part, the United States welcomes these developments because they give Japan the ability to share the burden of stability operations in greater East Asia.
·Lack of Strategic Alternatives for Security. While the factors discussed above bring the alliance closer over shared security interests, the most basic element in continued alliance closeness is a lack of alternative means of achieving this same degree of national security. Although the Japanese have expressed interest in expanding the ASEAN plus three security forum, there is no history of multilateralism in East Asia that supports such a system as a lasting means to ensure stability in the region.]5 While North Korea remains a powder keg and China's future strategic goals remain opaque, the alliance between the United States and Japan offers each the only clear and feasible security option. Because of this, the alliance will continue to be strong for the next decade or so. When external conditions and changes in military posture allow, both countries may view the alliance as an increasingly unreliable, and thus perhaps unnecessary, means of achieving security interests in the region.
Factors Reducing US-Japan Alliance Reliability
For a number of reasons, Japan will increasingly seek to chart its own course in the future and will be less likely to respond favorably and quickly to selected American requests for military and diplomatic support. Resource shortfalls, attitudinal changes, and an increased sense of self all combine to make the long-term health of the alliance questionable. As with most developed countries of the world, these concerns start with money and oil.
·Japanese Economic Woes. Although Japan's GDP growth is barely positive, the macro-economic situation in Japan continues to be extremely dismal. Huge budget deficits, reaching 48 percent of federal spending, have created mammoth national debt pressures. The banking and loan default crisis continues unabated as yet another bank has recently been nationalized to prevent its collapse. The future is no less bleak. The population of Japan, raised under the assumption of a generous social safety net, is increasingly aged and will face a pension crisis within decades. The net results of this economic situation are twofold. First, Japanese companies are forced to invest heavily in Chinese labor and resource markets, with resulting demands from the business community for policy accommodations toward China. Second, there is declining budget space for defense spending--a necessity to remain useful as an alliance partner with the United States. Although on one hand a lack of money for defense might drive the Japanese toward the Americans for protection, the failure of the Japanese to pull their weight in the alliance will further exacerbate American frustrations. The inability to fund military modernization on a large scale will only increase the capabilities gap between the two allies.
·Oil Demand and Resource Politics. Exceedingly energy-resource poor, Japan imports over 91 percent of its oil from the Middle East and is looking to diversify those sources. This need for oil will tend to increase US-Japan policy friction as Tokyo seeks separate accommodation with oil exporters, This has been seen clearly in Iran in recent months and will make Japan seek to accommodate Russian aspirations in the Far East. Oil needs likely will lead to Japanese divergence from American policy positions vis-h-vis a number of Asian and North African nations. While America is focused on fighting the war against terrorism and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies, the Japanese are focused on securing future import streams of oil and natural gas. The competing imperatives may lead to confrontations damaging to the alliance.
·Trade Frictions. Although now removed, the US steel tariffs and resulting punitive reactions from Japan were emblematic of a renewed friction in trade relations between Tokyo and Washington. Quiet for most of the 1990s due to the Japanese economic downturn, the recent spike in adverse trade policies reflects competing internal pressures in Tokyo. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, long the strongest supporter of the United States, is losing the policy fight with the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) which supports policies of economic growth at the expense of the alliance relationship. As long as economic recovery is at the fore of Japanese domestic politics, METI will continue to dominate the other ministries on external policy.
·Geopolitics in East Asia. Despite the prominence of history and recent territorial confrontations, trade relations and a desire to make a strategic hedge for the future have led to a significant Japanese detente with China since 1997. In 2003, Japan's bilateral trade with China surpassed $132 billion, representing a 30-percent increase from 2002 and passing the United States as Japan's top trading partner. Given the economic woes of Japan, these ties are vital to renewed Japanese financial and budgetary solvency. The situation with Taiwan, Japan's fourth largest trading partner, is similarly causing the Japanese to hedge away from the United States. As the Bush Administration tightens political and military ties with Taipei, many Japanese have begun to fear entrapment in a US-China confrontation. Combined with increased economic interaction and a desire to find a peaceful resolution to the DPRK nuclear crisis, this has led to renewed Japanese interest in enhancing diplomatic ties with the Middle Kingdom.
·Rebirth of Nationalism. As Eugene Matthews noted recently in Foreign Affairs, the Japanese are rediscovering their sense of nationalism and desire for independence of policy. Conversations with younger Japanese politicians about the alliance with America reveal a marked and relatively uniform desire for greater strategic self-determination. Although many in neighboring countries are shrill in their worry about a remilitarized Japan, it is folly to believe that Japan faces a choice between continued one-country pacifism and the nationalistic militarism of the 1930s. There are choices in-between, and the tone of learned writings and political statements from Japan indicate a reasoned and determined shift toward assertiveness and policy autonomy.
·Attitudes Among Japanese Toward American Foreign Policy. Central to the shift in policy stance among Japanese politicians and commentators is a concern with American power and perceived unilateralist tendencies. Like Germany, France, China, and Russia, Japan is concerned with American hegemony and the tendency of the United States to use force without international sanction. In polls of the Japanese people, North Korea and the United States are the two countries deemed most likely to involve Japan in a military conflict. By asserting the right of preemption and showing disdain for certain multinational agreements like the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Accords, the Bush Administration has alienated a large percentage of the Japanese public.
·Recent History of Timely Participation with the United States. Central to an American conception of reliability has been the willingness of Japan to participate in ventures the United States deems vital for the maintenance of global peace. Although the Japanese rapidly passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Act in November 2001 following the World Trade Center attacks, they have been notably reluctant to push forward plans that would put Japanese citizens in harm's way in support of American initiatives. The 1997 Revised Guidelines arose out of American concerns with Japanese reliability following the first Gulf War and the North Korean nuclear crisis of the mid- 1990s. American fears about nonresponsiveness and a Japanese unwillingness or inability to accept risk with the United States have not abated much since then. In the early summer of 2003, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi vowed to put Japanese forces on the ground in Iraq. It took nearly seven months (and numerous site surveys and public debate) for the first Japanese ground contingent to arrive at Samawah. Although the Bush Administration has been rigorous in avoiding the appearance of putting overt pressure on the Japanese, friction and frustration have risen on both sides.
·Public Fear of Casualties. Deep down, the past six decades of peace in Japan have resulted in an expanded conception of security that makes the safety of the individual citizen more important than overall national security. The noted commentator Seizaburo Sato poignantly described how the conception of "comprehensive security" has evolved over the last four decades in Japan, with the result being an "irrational" prioritization of the individual over the state, even ifnational survival would be at stake. Debate on this topic is muted in Tokyo, because very few commentators and even fewer politicians are willing to take the side of the state over the individual. Because of that, Japan has not yet come to any semblance of consensus on what national interests are worth the life of any of its citizens. Oil from South-west Asia, although it is without question the lifeline of Japan, is clearly not one of these interests. The machinations about finding a "safe" sector in Iraq is a case in point. Neither, it appears, is the war on terror--as the Japanese ships supporting Operation Enduring Freedom remain well beyond the range of threats. Nor does the need to take a hard line with North Korea over potential nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles (clearly pointed at Japan) super-cede the public desire to fully account for the handful of abducted Japanese citizens and their families in North Korea. At the end of the day, this fear of harm to the' individual puts the reliability of the alliance between the United States and Japan in serious question.
Trend Lines
As discussed above, there are numerous factors that both support and detract from the reliability of the alliance to ensure peace and stability in east Asia. For the most part, these issue areas are snapshots that by themselves do not adequately predict the future of the alliance. It is therefore useful to discuss trends among these factors, since the effects of some are unclear, while others are clearly increasing or decreasing in salience. The end result appears to indicate that the expansive view of the alliance, as conceived of by more optimistic Americans, could be in trouble, and security alternatives should be explored.
Unclear Trend Lines
For some factors, the direction of the trend line is unknown and could either support or detract from the alliance between the United States and Japan. Given the risk-averse nature of the Japanese and the impatience of Americans, the effect of these trends is probably toward a strategic hedging behavior instead of the extremes of outright dissolution of the alliance or complete military support for American initiatives.
The most important of these is the changing Japanese attitude toward national security and Japan's defense establishment. As discussed above in the sections on North Korea, terrorism, BMD, and weapons procurement, the Japanese are awakening to the security environment of the 21st century and building markedly improved military capabilities. The 2003 Defense White Paper and FY2004 budget submission indicate a clear recognition of the need for new military capabilities like power projection, precision-strike weaponry, and ballistic missile defense. These capabilities dovetail well with long-standing American desires for Japan, but whether or not they indicate a shift toward or away from a tighter military alliance is unknown. Clearly they make closer military cooperation possible. However, these new capabilities also put Japan on a course toward a more autonomous security posture should it choose to take that route.
The economic future of Japan also has an unclear effect on the alliance. Achieving security autonomy from the United States would be exceedingly costly for Japan. Unless Japan is willing to increase its defense budget to three to five percent of GDP from the current cap of one percent, it cannot buy its way out from under the alliance without seeking alternative means of reducing regional risk through accommodation with China. Expenditures of this magnitude do not appear possible for a Japan facing continued deep recession, immense social security obligations in the coming decades, and a public deeply skeptical of a huge defense buildup. Therefore, building key military capabilities, while avoiding alliance obligations that would jeopardize its relationship with China, appears to be the prudent middle road for Japan.
Finally, Japan's energy strategy in the coming decades presents an increasingly important security factor for Tokyo that will, like the economic situation, likely cause hedging behavior by the Japanese. Currently, Japan imports more than 90 percent of its oil from the Middle East but is looking for ways to reduce this dependency. Oil and gas ventures with Russia bring Japan into direct competition with China but also will demand Japanese strategic accommodation to non-American world powers.
Trending Toward Greater Importance
Some factors are clearly increasing in importance and therefore will have a large effect on the future of the alliance. The Japanese sense of nationalism and desire for self-determination of national policy are foremost on this list. The era of deference to the United States on key issues is over, and policy accommodation by Washington is increasingly expected by the Japanese. The increased hedging behavior by the Japanese toward China is also quite clear. Although the long-term designs of the Middle Kingdom worry the Japanese greatly, increasing economic interdependence, nascent regional multilateralism, and a common desire to reduce American hegemony are slowly driving closer Sino-Japanese ties. Finally, the Bush Administration appears to be pursuing alternative basing schemes in East Asia. This trend is more than simply a reaction to potential American hostages in Yongsan and may signal a strategic retrenchment in Asia and Europe. It is certain the Japanese have noticed the Rumsfeld initiatives, and the upcoming decision on whether or not to accept basing of the nuclear aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson in Yokosuka will significantly affect the pace of those alliance reviews.
On the other hand, the willingness of the Japanese to help secure sea lanes and fight missile proliferation shows an increasing congruence of interests with the United States in these vital areas. Protection of sea lanes by naval and coast guard forces--a defensive exercise--is seen by most Japanese as a more acceptable use of military force than putting ground troops into a contested region like Iraq or Afghanistan. Adding to the likelihood of further cooperation in this endeavor is the Maritime SelfDefense Force's willingness to push the boundaries of the Peace Constitution and cooperate with the US Navy when away from home ports.
Trending Toward Less Importance
Admittedly, most of the factors previously discussed are increasing in importance, although the end result on the alliance of the trends may not be readily apparent. Some do appear to be strategic speed bumps that will likely have minimal effect on the US-Japan partnership in coming years. Trade is one such area. Although much was made of the recently rescinded American steel tariffs and potential counter-tariffs from Japan, South Korea, and Europe, the Bush Administration is overwhelmingly composed of free-traders who will eventually regain policy control and work to open up markets. The alliance is not currently plagued by the economic competition that marked the 1980s and early 1990s, and which led some to label the Japanese as peer competitors ready to undermine American vital interests.
It is apparent that Japan is slowly achieving strategic freedom of action and therefore may not in the future feel bound to the asymmetrical nature of the alliance. Younger members of the Diet tend to agree with the politically powerful Shinzo Abe who remarked, "The defense relationship between [the United States and Japan] should be complementary and not dependent.''
The Alliance in 2015 and US Policy Recommendations
The overall trend for the United States is away from, rather than toward, rigid and formal alliances to obtain security in various regions of the world. The Cold War alliance structures, driven by bipolarity, are a historical aberration for the United States. Given the current asymmetrical distribution of world power, America will continue to find greater efficacy in informal coalitions than in long-term, formal alliances. By hedging with China and by dragging its feet on American initiatives in order to secure its own strategic flexibility, Japan will likely hasten the downfall of the alliance.
In 2015, the US-Japan Security Alliance still will be legally in force; however, both countries will likely have made great strides to expand their security options in the region beyond reliance on each other. Americans probably will retain considerable basing rights in Japan, though less than currently utilized, especially in Okinawa, which remains a lightning rod for nationalist complaints in Japan. The United States will be more focused on providing strategic balance in East Asia than on supporting any one particular nation, as strategic relations with China and Russia likely will be less confrontational. Japan will have a much more robust military capability and, with the exception of not having a nuclear deterrent, will be more active in East Asian security affairs and maintaining freedom of the seas. The Japanese likely will have publicly reexamined Article IX of their Constitution and legalized both the existence of a military and the ability to conduct collective defense with other nations. Finally, the two countries will have a significant cooperative venture ongoing in ballistic missile defense that serves well the interests of both countries without necessarily obligating military cooperation in other venues. On average, in 2015 the strategic vectors of Japan and the United States will have diverged significantly in many areas.
This view of the likely strategic situation between the United States and Japan a decade from now is in no way predetermined. Three situations in particular could reinvigorate the alliance and make it more akin to the Anglo-American relationship. Arise in aggressive, anti-Japanese supernationalism in China could convince Tokyo to abandon its hedging policies. A forcible reintegration of Taiwan or assertion of exclusive navigation rights by China in the South China Sea could also push the Japanese toward a more participatory stance in the alliance.
Finally, the reunification of Korea under a distinctly anti-Japanese banner would create the conditions necessary for both the United States and Japan to view the alliance as absolutely essential to their respective vital interests.
Given the issues and trends discussed above, the United States should follow a hedging strategy in Asia and adopt the following policy recommendations.
Policies to Enhance the Alliance
·Push combined ballistic missile development and fielding in a manner that requires Japan to resolve its political dilemma on collective defense without overtly applying international pressure.
·Mirror Japan's emergency legislation and increase in SDF roles with substantively increased bilateral command, control, and consultation mechanisms in Japan, US Pacific Command headquarters, and in the Pentagon.
·Continue the Bush Administration practice of frequent, high-level consultations with Japan so as to emphasize to both Japanese and other Asian audiences the importance the United States places on the relationship.
·Earnestly address Japanese concerns with the Status of Forces Agreement and make a substantive, though largely symbolic, withdrawal of some portion of the US Marine Corps presence in Okinawa. Move at least two Marine infantry battalions to alternative basing sites in Asia, possibly Darwin, upon completion of their tour in Iraq in 2005.
·If and when Japan "legalizes" its armed forces, make a highly public recognition of the legitimacy of that act for Asian audiences.
Policies to Increase Strategic Flexibility (Hedge) in Asia
·Work through or create a fabric of multilateral institutions to enhance security transparency in Asia, like the Proliferation Security Initiative, and create opportunities for collective action on regional issues.
·Seek alternative basing and military access arrangements in East and Southeast Asia. Expand island basing options in Guam and the western Pacific and explore potential basing or access options in Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam.
Conclusion
The eventual demise of the US-Japan Security Alliance is not a foregone conclusion. However, the trend lines in both Japan and the United States do not guarantee the retention of the alliance in the same form as today. Within the next decade, significant changes in the partnership will have to occur for the alliance to remain viable and effective for both countries. At the current trajectory, the perceived lack of reliability of Japan as an alliance partner will likely cause the United States to seek alternative means of achieving peace and stability in the region.
As seen from Tokyo, the asymmetrical nature of the alliance and the continued demands from Washington for military support around the globe create a burden ill-suited to the emerging Japanese view of themselves and the world. It is highly likely that both the United States and Japan will pursue hedging strategies in order to obtain more flexible security options in the future. Unless China emerges as an aggressive regional superpower or a reunified Korea becomes hostile to Japan and the Pacific interests of the United States, the centrality of the alliance is likely to diminish over the next 10 to 20 years.
The clarity of the Cold War is gone, and the emerging security environment is best served by flexible access and basing rights, rather than the formal alliances of the past half-century. It is best to recognize the dimensions of the new era now and move forward, rather than to drag along an alliance that may be past its prime.
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